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Introduction 
This chapter explores how the role, power and influence of the company secretary1 relates to 
other board members (chairman, chief executive officer (CEO), senior independent director 
(SID), non-executive director (NED)) in helping the board make better decisions. An analytical 
framework is developed that depicts this role’s heterogeneity and characteristics pertaining to 
effective leadership practices. 
So: why the company secretary? The roles and responsibilities of chairman, CEO, Chief 
Financial Officer (CFO), SID and NED are legislatively more developed, formally recognised and 
regularly evolved within governance, and are widely researched as leadership practices. Indeed, 
individuals in these corporate roles often become household names in media headlines on busi- 
ness successes or failures. Typically the chairman–CEO relationship has received much attention, 
while, emerging from the recent financial crisis of 2008, the NED role has re-gained promi- 
nence. In contrast, the company secretary role remains legislatively less well defined and subject 
to limited regulatory evolution. This role’s relationship to leadership practice is hardly researched 
(Cadbury, 2002; Roberts, 2002; Muller et al., 2007) and lacks empirical investigations (Erismann- 
Peyer et al., 2008). Can you name or recognise a company secretary in media circles? Yet, in this 
chapter, it will become clear that the company secretary not only has a long and majestic history, 
but is now also likely to be the longest-serving person in the boardroom. The company secretary 
is usually the first to know, and be closest to, the most up-to-date critical information; ideally 
placed as the key link between board/executive and chairman/other board members; and cen- 
trally involved in board processes (Finkelstein and Mooney, 2003) and agendas. If the company 
secretary role’s relationship to board leadership practices can be better understood as the ‘building 
block’ or ‘genesis’ for addressing the problematic, then the other roles are more easily aligned in 
achieving consensus. Illustrating the main question through a company secretary lens, two wider 
questions are brought into focus: why are the expectations from other board members about the 
company secretary role unclear, and how should boards relate to leadership practice? 
To address the main question and two wider problematic issues of the role’s link to leader- 
ship practice, this chapter will explore the role, power and influence of company secretaries 
through in-depth semi-structured interviews from mainly FTSE250 boards. These interviews 
  
 
 
Andrew Kakabadse et al. 
 
took place in 2014 and reflected on the post-financial crisis developments in the role and leader- 
ship practices of the company secretary. 
 
Role within a Board 
What does a company secretary do? Typical existing studies outline the role of company 
secretary as having formal responsibilities such as organising board meetings; supporting the 
chairman/CEO, directors and stakeholders; inducting or training non-executive directors; 
dealing with latest governance developments; board evaluations; annual reporting; statutory 
compliance issues; administrative duties; accurate Companies House filing; and stock exchange 
listing. However, the focus in this chapter is more on the informal aspects of the role. The 
company secretary has to adopt additional higher-order skills when relating to leadership prac- 
tice. The company secretary’s challenge is to resolve tension between being the invisible power 
behind the throne, i.e. in the shadow of the chairperson, and knowing how to diplomatically chal- 
lenge individual board member effectiveness towards higher collective board performance. This 
includes resolving dilemmas, dealing with complexity, making judgements, acting as advisor 
and/or confidante, and maintaining high levels of trust. The breadth of knowledge and diplo- 
matic skilfulness of the company secretary must balance crafting of relations with, and between, 
self-assured personalities (chair, CEO, CFO, SID, NEDs) and not expressing ego in oneself. 
Few would doubt that boards are an established governance mechanism, protecting the 
principals’ interests (Fama and Jensen, 1983) and acting as ‘large, elite, and episodic decision- 
making group/s’ that are networked to perform complex tasks in the realm of corporate strat- 
egy (Forbes and Milliken, 1999). This makes the role of company secretary particularly critical, 
as it is the crucial link that binds the other board roles together as a body; it always protects the 
interest of the company and tries to seek consensus amongst the board members as a leader- 
ship practice. This becomes even more critical when excessive ‘prozac leadership’ (Collinson, 
2012) often conceals power asymmetries and top-down control as a contribution to toxic or 
destructive behaviours (Schyns and Hansbroughn, 2010; Padilla et al., 2007). Although, within 
post-heroic leadership practices (Briskin, 2011) the more ‘heroic, charismatic and egoistic’ 
leadership roles may receive prominent attention (Fletcher and Kaufer, 2003), it is the more 
invisible (Ladkin, 2013), facilitative, interpersonal relational power of the company secretary 
that becomes politically critical in a major change or crisis situation (Van Essen et al., 2013). 
Presently, in the Anglo-Saxon context, the ‘company secretary’ (UK) is legally perceived as 
an ‘officer’ of the company. It is an executive position that usually reports directly to the chair- 
man and is the key point of contact for other board members. Actually, this occupation is an 
old art that can be traced back to its earliest predecessors of some 5,000 years ago in terms of its 
activities, such as registration, administration and organisation (Schlott, 1989). Despite this, today 
we typically more often refer to the East India Company (1600–1833/57) as the first joint-stock 
entity, with Seth’s (2012: 222) analysis asserting that ‘the past has the capacity to explain the 
present’ contemporary corporate behaviours and issues. However, the inner workings of boards 
are mostly confined to those participating in their meetings, rendering empirical research lim- 
ited. Within this sanctum, the company secretary has always been present but is largely ignored 
(McNulty and Stewart, 2014; Hilb, 2011) resulting in a paucity of research on this role. 
 
Invisible Leadership Practices 
In pursuing a study of the role in relation to leadership practice, we use a broad-minded lens 
of power (Pettigrew, 1992). This is a subjective approach that overcomes the limitations of 
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confining leadership to formal attributes only, such as a simple legal role, managerial thinking 
or boxed quantitative rationalisations. It allows for a more holistic, meaningful, understanding 
of the higher-order skills, competencies and informal attributes that are needed by the company 
secretary in practising governance and leadership. Pettigrew (1992) argues for considering the 
board as an open system and that studies of board roles should not be separated from studies 
of power in institutions and society, nor from studies of the composition and attributes of top 
management teams. Others argue that research should expose the hidden dynamics of board- 
rooms (Van der Walt and Ingley, 2003). Understanding the role via this lens allows for both 
formal/informal practices and multi-level influences on the role to be considered as behaviours 
(van Ees et al., 2009). Other studies have adopted a spatial governance perspective (McNulty 
and Stewart, 2014); our emphasis, however, is on interpreting organisations as being more 
complex, and consisting of people with less predictable attributes, particularly in the range of 
leadership roles (Balkundi and Kilduff, 2006). 
As such, in this study the definition of leadership practice is focused on how the com- 
pany secretary uses ‘role, power and influence’ (Pettigrew, 1992; Lukes, 1974) to affect board 
decision-making. This broader definition enables the exploration of the informal, discrete, 
third-dimensional aspects of power, which can influence policy and board outcomes. These 
leadership practices take place behind the scenes; they are political or relational aspects beyond 
the typical formal role. Our findings explore the subtle, moral and relational dilemmas that the 
company secretary faces. The semi-structured interviews we conducted demonstrate how vari- 
ably company secretaries operate, exercise power, and influence dynamics at board level within 
and outside the boardroom. We term these practices invisible leadership. 
Attention is given to how the company secretary deals with power plays within the board 
and organization. In so doing, how is the company secretary’s role exposed to the decision- 
making processes within the board? We analyse the notion of discretion in the company sec- 
retary’s role, and take account of structure and processes in relation to influencing the board of 
directors, helping them make better decisions. 
 
Historical Development of the Role 
The position of company secretary has a rich history. Ancient scribes, who were involved in all 
matters of writing, embodied functions which are precursors to those of the modern company 
secretary (Boylan, 1922). From an organisational perspective, the role’s ancient, informal origins 
can be traced to the Egyptians (3000 bce) although it did not achieve formal legal status until 
1841. The most significant recorded company secretary developments stem from the colonisa- 
tion period of 1550 to 1650, which saw the rise of the English Levant and East India Companies 
(Kaye, 1853; Adams, 1996; Gepken-Jager et al., 2005). The Pontifex v Bignold case of 1841 set a 
precedent related to the power of the company secretary. More recently, the duties and respon- 
sibilities of the role were more closely defined (Monsted and Garside, 1991; Cadbury Report, 
1992), followed by a phase of wider legal and regulatory enhancements (Daigneault, 2006). 
In the English Levant Company (formed in 1581), the company secretary held considerable 
powers, such as commanding actions to be performed in Her Majesty’s name (Epstein, 1908: 
74). In the East India Company (formed in 1600), the secretary post at its London-based head- 
quarters became the ‘Secretary of State’, with the power to control the proceedings of the com- 
pany. The secretary post on the trading side was responsible for the administration, registration 
and implementation of acts of parliament, and was given the task of exercising the stipulations 
from the Supreme Court of Judicature (Kaye, 1853: 131; Ramaswami, 1983: vi–viii). In the 
Dutch East India Company (formed in 1602), the company secretary at headquarters held a dual 
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role as secretary of the board and as the board’s advocate and advisor on legal matters (Schmidt 
et al., 1988: 58; Gepken-Jager et al., 2005: 52). At the same time, the secretary at the trading com- 
pany held extensive and concentrated legislative and executive powers (Naval, 1920: 248–249). 
The collapse of the Levant and East India Companies marked the end of the monopolistic 
trading company with powers to execute sovereign rights (Schmidt et al., 1988: 6), which dra- 
matically reduced the power exercised by the company secretary. No longer did this role com- 
bine the affairs of state and company. The powerful political duties of the company secretary, 
granted by the state and parliament, were decoupled from the duties covering company affairs. 
From then on, the role of company secretary has focused on narrower commercial, economic 
and legal affairs. 
During the period 1750–1850, the company secretary resumed the role of ‘servant’ of the 
corporation and ‘secretary of the society’ with specialised tasks (transferring company shares; 
seconding resolutions; registering share transfers; acting on behalf of the company; handling 
unclaimed dividends; and deleting member names from the company registers) but without the 
authorisation and responsibility to represent the company externally (Pontifex v Bignold, 1841; 
Severn & Wye & Severn Bridge Railway Co, 1896). In the period 1900 to 1950, judicial out- 
comes such as Panorama Developments, Guildford, Ltd v Fidelis Furnishing Fabrics Ltd, 1971 rede- 
fined the company secretary as an officer of the company connected with administrative affairs, 
thus determining the ‘profession’s duties and responsibilities’ (Monsted and Garside, 1991: 4). 
The corporate scandals of the 1980s led to renewed stress on regulation and corporate 
governance (Cadbury Report, 1992), thereby expanding the duties of the company secre- 
tary. Around 2000, the role expanded to include certain corporate governance responsibilities 
(Murphy, 2003; Monks and Minow, 2004; Daigneault, 2006). The company secretary today 
has responsibilities as outlined in the introduction. These responsibilities – include ensuring that 
the corporate entities meet governance requirements (Companies House reporting); follow- 
ing procedures set out in law (formal board meetings; appointments; reporting); and ensuring 
stakeholder satisfaction (shareholders/directors/media) – become critical to company interests 
in major change or crises situations. In highly regulated and competitive environments such as 
that of the UK (Burton, 2000), boards as top teams are always under pressure to perform well 
and meet shareholder and wider stakeholder expectations. The company secretary has to learn 
to deal with and manage power relations at this level within and outside the organisation as a 
form of leadership practice. 
The company secretary as corporate governance officer (Steger and Bottger, 2008; Filiz 2013) 
has the responsibility to raise the question ‘What is the right thing to do?’ (Gallagher, 2002: 41) 
and is ‘in a prime position to make these judgments and then advocate them with management 
and the board’ (Gallagher, 2002: 42). These days, the professional bodies such as the Institute of 
Chartered Secretaries and Administrators (ICSA)2 (Armour, 2012) and other associations, such 
as the Institute of Directors, UK (Ashton, 2008) are politically critical to the standing of the role 
amongst the board members and the development of the role and its responsibilities. 
The history of the development of the company secretary role suggests that it has influential 
importance, particularly post-crisis when there has been renewed attention paid to its responsibil- 
ities. There is criticism, however, that the power of the role remains constrained, under-utilised 
and/or misunderstood. 
 
Power of Company Secretary 
Lamm (2003: 24) argues for the company secretary’s dual role, being ‘inclusive of corporate 
governance function’, as the optimal position in the organisation. The law defines the company 
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secretary as an officer with administrative duties and responsibilities, but because of its founda- 
tion in law, this role sets the tone for, and is central to, the provision of an underlying internal 
framework for corporate governance structures (Filiz, 2013). Hence, the company secretary is 
required to provide administrative and legal governance support to the board of directors and 
the CEO (Lamm, 2003). 
In order to be effective, the company secretary must maintain direct relations with these two 
different sets of actors at the ‘apex of the firm’s decision control system’ (Fama and Jensen, 1983) 
to act as a protector of the interests of the principals’ (board directors) and the management 
(agents). Scholars posit that powerful boards are desirable as this increases their ability to moni- 
tor and control the CEO’s actions (Chen, 2007; Petra, 2005) as part of overseeing corporate 
governance execution (Finkelstein et al., 2009). Due to more frequent interactions, the prevail- 
ing relationships of the company secretary are more likely to be with the board of directors. 
This positioning does not diminish the influential link the company secretary provides between 
the board, individual board members and executive management, often acting as the impartial 
moderator or mediator. 
It is further recognised that the nature of the company secretary’s role and activities is influ- 
enced by external (i.e. statutory and regulatory requirements) and internal (i.e. procedures such 
as company-specific articles of association/by-laws; company policies; employment contracts) 
factors. The extent of these interactions depends upon the individual in the role of company 
secretary and how he/she responds to changes in formal structures and to new requirements 
as demanded by the role (Beattie, 1980), along with how the role itself fits, and has been 
developed, within the company. The unique behavioural demand lies in balancing information 
requirements and communication effectiveness. The company secretary needs to engage with 
internal and external stakeholders; negotiate critical and asymmetric information between dif- 
ferent interests; and balance the board and management interface in a way that avoids undue 
antagonism, placates differences, and achieves alignment between the demands of two, and 
often more, bipolar cultures. 
The role is mandatory for publicly listed companies, which are obliged to follow statu- 
tory and reporting requirements (Dubs, 2006). Beyond that, there is flexibility and discre- 
tionary capacity. Characteristics and required competencies include administration, business 
awareness, communication skills, compliance, guidance, information impact, knowledge 
shaping, maintenance, management, organisation, process, procedure, qualification, rela- 
tionship, and shareholder and stakeholder engagement (Vance, 1983; Hannigan, 2009). 
Activities include keeping the company register, filing, recording, monitoring, supervising, 
educating, advising, managing, and co-ordinating. The combination of characteristics and 
activities forms the unique and specific company secretary role and its related functions 
(Vance, 1983; ICSA, 2012). Although the ‘precise duties of the company secretary are not 
generally prescribed by statute – they will usually need to be set out in his/her contract of 
employment’ (Morris et al., 2009: 223). 
As it channels information flows between the board of directors and executive management, 
the role is significant to board members as an ‘up to date source of information’ (Kakabadse 
et al., 2014). The company secretary manages the information flow. Planning formal com- 
munications with board members requires an understanding of who needs to be informed; 
what information is needed; how to present it; and the frequency and form of communication 
(Herbert, 1977). The process is designed to influence opinions, perceptions and relationships, 
and/or to initiate board and management team actions. It is the company secretary who is 
most likely to be closest to the dynamic holistic agenda and who understands the more subtle 
informal individual preferences, personalities and likely reactions. 
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Although the company secretary often has a low profile in the boardroom, the role is critical 
to board resolutions and actions. In the majority of cases, it is the preparatory work in advance of 
board meetings that influences outcomes, enabling the conversion of strategy into implementable 
action plans (Arnold, 1987). Preparatory work influences the frequency, venue and duration of 
board meetings; interactions between the CEO and the board; finding solutions to issues; ensur- 
ing a level of consensus among directors; the form and technicalities of board proceedings; and 
involvement of boards in self-evaluation (Zahra and Pearce, 1989; Vance, 1983). It is the company 
secretary who facilitates timely meetings; ensures the discussion of issues to the required depth; 
respects disagreements between directors; ensures that directors participate in the decision-making 
process rather than just ceding the decision to the CEO; and ensures that minutes are well formu- 
lated and documented to monitor progress (Zahra and Pearce, 1989: 310; Vance, 1983: 24–27). 
Recent research identifies the company secretary as the lynchpin in the communication 
process between the CEO and the board (Kakabadse et al., 2014; Baron and Kenny, 1986), 
overcoming inadequacies, manipulation, reliability issues or delays that may impede board effec- 
tiveness (Zahra and Pearce, 1989; Kakabadse et al., 2010). This often extends to the company 
secretary being the third person in the CEO-chairman relationship. Whereas the CEO has hier- 
archical authority, the chairman is primus inter pares, the first among equals (Levrau and Van den 
Burghe, 2013: 108) as head of a collegial body. This allows the company secretary’s extensive 
discretionary influence to exercise relational power. This may be in the way that or level of 
detail in which information is presented or communicated, catering to different preferences or 
needs. Or it may be in the way information is prioritised/selected as being important enough to 
warrant discussion in a board meeting. 
Macro-analysis focuses attention on sources of power such as position, expertise, access 
to information, motivation and rewards (Pettigrew, 1972). More subtly, the ability of an 
individual or group to realise their intended effects is related to their capability of leverag- 
ing relational/micro-aspects of power, which are contingent on the degree of dependency 
(French and Raven, 1959) or currency to make connections and appropriately influence others 
(Pettigrew, 1972). Thus, the power capability of the company secretary requires behavioural 
analysis (Cyert and March, 1963; Huse, 2005) of those involved, coupled with structural 
positioning of roles held (van Ees et al., 2009; Dalton and Daily, 1997; Roberts et al., 2005). 
The power of individuals within a group is primarily derived from five sources: reward, 
punishment (coercion), legitimacy, knowing other people (referent) and having expert skill or 
knowledge (French and Raven, 1959; Raven 2008). More widely, Giddens (1984) asserts that 
power is of central, if not exclusive, importance to the ‘Constitution of Society’, a component 
of social structure exercised by human agents with the capacity to enable or constrain each 
other. Consequently, knowledge is not objective, but an outcome of continuous negotiation 
between individuals, reflecting an inseparable link between subject and object (Sandberg, 2005). 
As such, the company secretary possesses knowledge not only of processes and procedures, but 
of associated ‘corporate memory’, enabling greater indirect ability to influence board-level deci- 
sion making through less observable behaviours, and acts of consensus-building and prevention 
of conflict (Kakabadse et al., 2014). 
Steven Lukes’s (1974) typology of the three dimensions of power is a useful analytic for dem- 
onstrating a fundamental distinction between decisional and non-decisional exercises of power 
within the boardroom. Lukes (1974: 23) observes that ‘the most effective and insidious use of 
power is to prevent conflict from arising in the first place’. Importantly, a lack of conflict and 
the appearance of consensus do not equal the absence of power relations. That is, those subject 
to power can be ‘socialised’ into a false appreciation of their real interests, and thereby act against 
them, whilst believing that they are acting according to their preferences (Young, 1978). 
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Third-Dimensional ‘Smart Power’ 
Exploring the dynamics of power within the boardroom elite and episodic decision-making 
in group interactions provides new insight into informal leadership practices such as managing 
information flow, dealing with personalities, negotiating the possible outcomes, and managing 
company interests and individual expectations, all as views of power. The discrete, informal pro- 
cesses of elite communication, socialisation, acculturation and fraternisation are central to any 
understanding of board consensus (Pettigrew, 1992). Power relations within elite settings such 
as the boardroom tend to reinforce and perpetuate the dominant logic. However, it is impor- 
tant to recognise that the legitimised constructions that form the social context of boardroom 
interactions are far from absolute; individuals have strengths, weaknesses and different agendas, 
making decision making politically complex (van Ees et al., 2009). 
Drawing on Lukes’s (1974: 2005) concept of third-dimensional power, this study considers 
the discrete mechanisms of preference formation at play within boardroom elite interactions. 
How does the company secretary deal with power plays within the board and the organisation? 
How is the company secretary’s role exposed to the decision-making process within the board? 
Lukes (2005) argues that we need to think about power broadly and pay attention to those 
aspects of power that are least accessible to observation. Power is an imposition of internal 
constraints; those subject to it acquire beliefs that result in their consent, or their adaptation, to 
domination, in its either coercive or non-coercive forms. 
The first dimension of power is actual observable behaviour (Dahl, 1957; Polsby, 1963) 
in situations in which the powerful prevail. The second dimension of power has observable 
instances of control through ‘soft initiatives’ and is about control over non-decision making, 
i.e. ‘where demands for change . . . can be suffocated before they are even voiced, or kept 
covert’ (Bachrach and Baratz, 1970: 44). This introduces ‘mobilisation of bias’ (Bachrach and 
Baratz, 1962: 948) as a prevailing set of subjectivities (values, beliefs) of one group over another, 
e.g. strategic agenda setting grounded in matters outside the boardroom. Such pre-decisional 
activities are of critical importance in determining the decisions that will, ultimately, be made 
down the line (Cobb, 1983; Rose-Ackerman and Long, 1982). 
The third dimension is where ‘the supreme exercise of power is to get others to have the 
desires you want them to have’ (Lukes, 1974: 23). The powerful can symbolically or cov- 
ertly shape agents’ awareness of their interest and ability to act. This operates at an ideologi- 
cal, normative level, at which interests remain concealed. This may be at work somewhere 
within, and between, the structural determinants of the boardroom and the issue definition and 
agenda-setting activities as a boardroom process (Table 16.1). 
Applying Lukes’s (1974) third-dimensional or ‘smart power’ to the company secretary role 
provides insights into the less obvious, subtle, relational and political aspects that are usually 
behind the more formal overt elite boardroom interactions and their consensus-formation activ- 
ities. Smart power is exercised through sensitive diplomatic dialogue, in which endurance is 
underpinned to build trust, which should be at the core of effective boardroom interactions. 
Consensus building emerges as covert, informal, massaging, positioning and posturing of strate- 
gies that unlock or reinforce structural resistances to dynamic change. The company secretary, 
with unique direct relations to board members and executives, has discrete power over the 
desires and beliefs that shape boardroom dynamics. Thus, this radical conceptual mechanism 
suits the exploration of the questions of whether, and how, the preferences of elite participants 
have been influenced without their knowledge. 
In her commentary on boardroom practice, Baroness Kingsmill (2008: 24) notes that the 
company secretary is ‘the best guide to board etiquette’, through their role of servant of the 
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board and employee of the company. The company secretary has often served under a number 
of CEOs and chairmen and as such ‘can be an important source of information and guidance’ 
(Kingsmill, 2008: 24). The company secretary takes the minutes, so if a board member wants to 
ensure that his/her points are recorded elegantly, they need to ‘become their friend’ (Kingsmill, 
2008: 24). At a deeper level, the company secretary’s invisible leadership as lessons of ‘service’ 
stands out from following meagre rules and hierarchical titles, to help others create meaning and 
purpose by engaging moral and human dimensions to the bigger picture and in not allowing 
leadership to ‘begin and end with themselves’ (Sena et al., 2013: 41). 
Here we draw upon evidence from a study that was informed by 40 one-to-one semi-structured 
qualitative interviews with company secretaries, chairmen, CEOs, NEDs and independent 
 
 
Table 16.1 Three Dimensions of Power 
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Characteristics First Dimension of 
Power - Hard/Formal 
Power 
Second Dimension of 
Power - Soft Power 
Third Dimension of 
Power - Smart/Informal 
Power 
Synonyms  Material or 
structural 
 Normative (or 
value) or civilian 
 Elite networks 
Primary leavers  Economic 
 Structures 
 Military/ 
technology 
 Policy outcomes 
 Economic 
 Bureaucratic 
 Collaborative 
institutions 
 Different 
subjective 
interests in policy 
outcomes 
 Media 
 Voluntary 
intuitions 
 Multinational 
corporations 
(MNEs) 
 Knowledge for 
control 
 Single interest 
policy 
Secondary leavers  Institutions 
 Normative 
 Structures 
 Co-operation for 
interest 
 Economics 
 Politics 
Perceived effect  Coercive 
 Observable 
 Institutional 
building 
 Behavioural 
 Collaboration/ 
co-operation 
 Strategic 
Partnership, 
Engagement 
 Organisation 
building 
 Decision making 
and Non-decision 
making 
 Grievances 
 Consensus 
building 
 Emergent 
 Invisible/ 
pre-positional 
 Framed debate 
(delineated 
parameters for 
debate) 
 Issues and 
potential issues 
Empirical Inquiry Observable power – 
Decision situation 
and exercises 
of power are 
a product of 
conflict of interests 
over political 
preferences (overt) 
Observable power – 
power located 
within the decision 
process (overt and 
covert) 
Power is situated 
in controlled 
preferences (i.e. not 
directly observable) 
Latent conflict 
Subjective and real 
agenda. (covert) 
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Conceptualisation 
of power 
‘The ability of A 
to get B to do 
something he 
or she would 
otherwise not do’ 
(Dahl, 1957: 202) 
‘Is also exercised 
when A devotes his 
energies to creating 
or reinforcing social 
and political values 
and institutional 
practices that limit 
the scope of the 
political process to 
public consideration 
of only those 
issues which are 
comparatively 
innocuous to A’ 
(Bachrach and 
Baratz, 1962: 948) 
‘A may exercise 
power over B by 
getting him to do 
what he does not 
want to do, but 
he also exercises 
power over him by 
influencing, shaping 
or determining 
his very wants. 
Indeed, is it not the 
supreme exercise 
of power to get 
another or others 
to have the desires 
you want them 
to have?’ (Luke, 
1974: 23) 
Influential authors Dahl, 1957; Polsby, 
1963 
Bachrach and Baratz 
(1962) 
Schattschneider (1975); 
Lukes (2005) 
Source: compiled by the authors. 
 
 
consultants, which were facilitated through focus group sessions (12) and distributed question- 
naires. The one-to-one interviews lasted, on average, 70 minutes each, whilst the focus group 
sessions were designed for two hours each and consisted of between 5 and 20 people per session. 
Participants were purposefully selected from the ICSA register. A total of 206 participants pro- 
vided detailed accounts (Harre and Secord, 1972; Kakabadse and Louchart, 2012) of their beliefs 
about and experiences and perceptions of the company secretary. 
The unit of analysis is the individual company secretary. All interviews and focus group ses- 
sions were recorded and transcribed; the less detailed questionnaire responses were taken as writ- 
ten responses. The inquiry process interpretively analysed interviews/focus groups/questionnaires 
reflectively, seeking the deeper inter-subjective meanings of the third-dimensional ‘smart power’ 
that underpins boardroom elite interaction and consensus  formation. 
The primary interest was to achieve understanding of a company secretary’s exercise of 
power, rather than to explain and predict their future behaviours. With this perspective, the 
view was taken that nothing was trivial in company secretary interactions with relevant others, 
and that everything they do has the potential for unlocking understanding about the exercise of 
their power (Janesick, 1994). 
Qualitative data analysis (Miles and Huberman, 1994) by the Henley Business School research 
team used open coding techniques to assign descriptive phrases. Several themes emerged within 
the interview narratives (Corbin and Strauss, 1990). Discrepancies were resolved through inten- 
sive discussions within the team as part of the iterative development process. This allowed for 
how company secretaries perceive themselves and how other board members perceive and 
define the company secretary at the board level. 
Finally, a focus group session with study participants was convened, which verified the find- 
ings through presentation and participative discussion. 
Three major themes, each with sub-themes, emerged from our analysis, namely: company 
secretary’s role, power and influence as invisible leadership or third-dimensional power. 
 
249 
  
 
 
Andrew Kakabadse et al. 
 
Company Secretary’s Power 
In this section, the themes that impact on the third-dimensional invisible role, power and 
influence of the company secretary are shared. 
 
Role 
Each organisation and board is unique. A company secretary’s power depends on their ability 
to negotiate structure and position the role in a way that is effective for them within the team: 
 
You’re not a member of the executive team, you’re not a member of the board, you’re the 
interface between board and executive, you’ve got to have independence. 
Co.sec. 
 
A higher level of self-confidence and assuredness within the elite cadre is required, particularly 
as board members often misunderstand or lack awareness of the role of the company secretary: 
 
You have the same liabilities as executive directors, but you don’t sit on the board but are 
trusted to sign everything . . . I’m not someone’s secretary, I am the Company Secretary 
which is different. 
Co. sec. 
 
The associated history and self-moulding of the role affects the power the individual wields within 
the group context, and to what extent personal skillsets drive duality or wider commitments: 
 
As general counsel you are heavily involved in the running of the business and are the chief 
executive’s right hand. This is different to being the chairman’s right hand as company 
secretary. 
Co. sec. 
 
The company secretary’s power depends on managing and coping with ethical dilemmas and 
issues of trust and in putting the best interest of the organisation first: 
 
I enjoy the moral ethical dilemmas, I am always trying to work out what is the best thing 
to do in this situation. You need to be a diplomat, have thick skin, be resilient and for this 
you need independence. 
Co. sec. 
 
It goes to chairman and chief executive, but maybe the chief executive wants to change it 
and chairman doesn’t. 
Co. sec. 
 
Many respondents note that the nature of the role is changing due to developments in report- 
ing requirements, governance, board processes and stakeholder engagement post-financial crisis 
(2008). The findings illustrate that high-performing company secretaries help to build trust, 
which results in good governance. Examples may be preparedness for regulatory changes that 
affect the corporation; being accessible/available to all board members equally; being seen to be 
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transparent in business matters, but dealing sensitively with personal director matters (e.g. the 
NED facing legal issues on another board, or indicating that they wish to step down). 
 
Power 
A company secretary’s discretionary power, and to some extent their authority, is defined by 
how much power the chairman chooses to give: 
 
What you do as company secretary can principally depend on what chairman wants you to 
do . . . company secretary is there to support the chairman. 
Chairman 
 
Respondents note that the company secretary has to mould him/her self to fit the relation- 
ship with the chairman, but they are also an invisible leader and close trusted advisor to board 
members. Thus, the company secretary needs to be a good follower–leader in knowing how 
and when to speak up. 
Another power factor for the company secretary stems from knowing the individual board 
members at a more personal level: 
 
You need to be able to relate to people. The board and executive both trust you . . . you 
act as confidante, advisor, sounding board . . . things they might not want to say directly 
to each other. 
Co. sec. 
But, at the same time, the company secretary’s power demands an ability to be impartial and 
unbiased in finding the balance between private and public, or challenging board members for 
effectiveness: 
 
I use the term Switzerland . . . my role is one of neutrality 
Co. sec. 
 
Judgement is sometimes exercised behind the scenes, helping to steer the right direction. 
Co. sec. 
 
The nature of demands placed on the company secretary requires their ability to move from the 
detail to considering the holistic issue in a broader context: 
 
You need to think very quickly on your feet . . . and be proactive and reactive all the time. 
Co. sec. 
 
Consequently, the company secretary benefits from experience and knowledge in being able 
to exert power: 
 
Understanding the business is vital, you don’t operate in a vacuum, you need to know what 
the drivers are. 
Co. sec. 
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Many respondents note that the power of the company secretary comes to the fore in a crisis, 
major change situation or when directors fall out with each other. In such cases, the company 
secretary’s power to avoid conflict and find consensus makes the difference between success- 
ful outcomes and risk of failure. Examples from high-performing company secretaries may 
be when the chairman and CEO do not get on, knowing where the expertise lies within the 
boardroom and getting the right know-how about what to do quickly, or being the independ- 
ent party between board members that have strong, different, views. The crafting of relations 
for effectiveness is a continuous process. 
 
Influence 
The majority of respondents agree that being organised and efficient enables the ability to 
influence and facilitate alliances, even as an observer: 
 
It can be quite powerful to observe and then have a quiet word on the side. . . . Company 
secretaries can add value by precisely observing dynamics and how it affects decision 
making. 
Co. sec. 
 
Each time a new member enters the board there is a new balance of power. 
Co. sec. 
 
The power of highly skilled company secretaries emerges in being the primary point of informa- 
tion and its quality for board and governance matters: 
 
You are not only a conduit of information across and between levels, but make sure they 
get the right information. 
Co. sec. 
 
Agenda setting can be a trade off between different priorities. The power of the company sec- 
retary in organising pre-meetings, taking minutes and guiding board members’ thinking is a 
subtle process: 
 
Agenda setting is straight forward in that the directors know what they want to say, but you 
also know what they don’t want to talk about and what needs to be discussed . . . you can 
get board and management to talk. 
Co. sec. 
 
the board says no but it does not necessarily mean No. 
Co. sec. 
 
The ability of the company secretary to influence also arises in that, more often, they are the 
stability factor and have corporate memory of the issues: 
 
Corporate memory of the change through good times and bad . . . the tenure of company 
secretary tends to be longer than CEO these days . . . suddenly people are looking at you 
for a view. 
Co. sec. 
 
252 
  
 
 
Role of the Company Secretary 
 
Underlying this influential power is the fact that the role of the company secretary can be a 
lonely position, as only they have the depth and understanding of the issue. Further, if they take 
a stand for the company’s interests, it can go against some board members’ views. Highly effec- 
tive company secretaries demonstrate an ability to exercise independent views. Examples may 
be their active vocal opinions/engagement in board meetings rather than through the chairman; 
their ability to say ‘No’ to taking on additional responsibilities; or knowing the inner conversa- 
tions of different committee meetings, but also knowing the boundaries between them. 
Communication and use of language is a critical feature of being able to influence. The major- 
ity of respondents agree that company secretaries adopt a non-confrontational, non-threatening, 
and more subdued and cautious approach to matters: 
 
You’ve got to be discrete, diplomatic, have integrity . . . subtle use of language . . . there is 
a difference between discuss, debate, debate at length, challenge and question. 
Co. sec. 
 
I tend to avoid conflict and try and find other ways rather than confrontational. 
Co. sec. 
 
You need to be able to read people, understand them and speak their language. 
Co. sec. 
 
Highly effective company secretaries generally avoid strong language and are diplomatic in 
what they say and how they frame it. This even extends to their ability to read peoples per- 
sonalities and body language, and deal with each person in a different way that is comfortable 
to the other party. 
 
Company Secretaries’ Invisible Leadership as 
Third-Dimensional Power 
The third-dimensional power of the company secretary emerges as a combination of role, power 
and influence that combine in giving the company secretary a powerful and unique position as 
the pivotal role between board and executive management (Table 16.2 below). 
In table 16.2, each company secretary’s capacity for the 15 characteristics determines their 
overall level of power heterogeneity that establishes their discretionary power capacity and 
credibility as part of the team. 
In third-dimensional form, power is highly dependent on subtle communication. Human 
communication is not limited to the message conveyed only by written (Treece, 1972) or cho- 
sen spoken words, but embraces paralinguistic characteristics such as voice inflection, accelera- 
tion and deceleration, body language and emotional articulation (Watzlawick et al., 2011). The 
common elements to most communication models are the message senders (i.e. encoder), the 
message, the channel and the message receiver (i.e. decoder) (Arnold, 1987: 33–34). The com- 
pany secretary’s depth and diversity of communication skills enable better relations to the other 
board roles as leadership practice. By understanding the other board members as people with 
personalities first and then engaging with each board member differently to suit their needs, the 
company secretary is important to building trust amongst board members. The effective com- 
pany secretary then may support, over a period of time, more openness and quality of dialogue 
at the board level. This role is therefore always asking how information helps knowledgeable 
decision making, and what is best and right for the organisation. 
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Table 16.2 Third-Dimensional Discretionary Power of Company Secretary 
 
Characteristics Role Power Influence 
Invisible 
Leadership 
Power 
Heterogeneity 
Clarity of 
understanding (i) 
Chairman’s desire and 
relations (i) 
Forging alliances (i) 
Structure/position and 
standing (i) 
Board member 
relations (i) 
Right and quality 
information (i/e) 
Self-confidence (i) Private/Public (i) Corporate 
memory (i) 
Ethical resilience (i) Detail/Holistic (i/e) Agenda steering (i) 
Adaptability and 
preparedness (e) 
Experience/Knowledge 
(i/e) 
Diplomacy in 
language and 
conduct (i) 
Power tension Shaping regulation (e) Tension as outward 
facing (e) 
Equitable status (e) 
How role can better 
relate to others for 
leadership practice 
Building trust Crafting relations Having 
independence 
Source: Designed by authors from interviews applied to Lukes (1974, 2005) 
(Table key: i – internally focused; e – externally focused;  Dominant characteristic) 
 
The dominant characteristics within table 16.2, from our research, are role – self-confidence; 
power – chairman desires and relations; influence – ability to forge alliances. These are most 
commonly critical to company secretaries’ power and, interestingly, are all derived within the 
organisation. Research suggests that the company secretary context is influenced as powerful 
CEOs or powerful boards prefer engaging similar directors, whereby boards may be more passive 
or active (Westphal and Zajac, 1995; Westphal and Stern, 2006). 
The gaps or tensions in power for the company secretary are that they have less power to 
shape regulation; lower power on externally facing capacity/stakeholder engagement; and 
their ability to influence may be constrained due to lack of equitable status amongst the other 
board members and executives. Interestingly, the power constraints are all derived externally 
to the organisation. 
In board cadres, the quality of individual leadership capacity is commonly observable amongst 
peers (chair, CEO, SID, NED) as IQ (intelligence) and PQ (political acumen) within the group 
decision-making setting. Where invisible leadership and follower–leader combine, the company 
secretary uniquely and consistently engages higher order EQ (emotional) and moral (MQ) skills 
to a greater level in leadership decision making. However, power is perceived differently with 
board members seeing words as most important and the company secretary seeing more subtle 
actions as important (Odhiambo and Hii, 2012). This power often remains as ‘invisible leader- 
ship’ to the observing stakeholder group. This is why the expectations of other board members 
of the role of company secretary are often unclear. Our findings indicate that the chairman must 
actively support and visibly promote the role of the company secretary to other board members 
on more equitable terms to enable credibility. 
Our findings indicate that the role of the company secretary can relate better to other board 
members, where highly effective company secretaries are able to do a better job by building 
trust, crafting relations and exercising independence in the role. Where we have focused on the 
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company secretary to illustrate the point, these links between role and leadership also require 
other board members to engage in such practices through regular contact, meeting face to face, 
bringing wider experiences and expert knowledge to bear, new suggestions and ideas, defending 
what is right, seeking and adopting best practices, getting to know each other and the organisa- 
tion, and knowing the strategy and direction in context. It is the daily routines and individual 
habits that leaders should be improving, adapting and constantly applying to enhance their 
leadership practices. 
 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, the discretionary capacity and reputation of the company secretary as third- 
dimensional power is derived internally to the organisation and remains largely ‘invisible 
leadership’. Regardless of the historical narrowing of the powerful secretary role, its renewed 
corporate form in the ASCG3 framework is emerging with extensions to governance respon- 
sibilities (towards CGO4). Thus, there is an opportunity to bridge the power tensions between 
the internal and external demands of the role and the invisible and visible power play in group 
decision making; and to recognise that all regulatory requirements stretch the nature of power 
demands. After all, the company secretary is the invisible power behind the throne! 
This covert leadership may be preferred by other board members. However, company 
secretaries may offer more effectiveness through tempered leadership (Roberts et al., 2008) 
with more visible power. The informal, covert 15 ‘invisible leadership’ characteristics are 
presently dominated by self-confidence (role); chairman desires (power) and forging alli- 
ances (influence). The move towards greater visible power requires the company secretary 
to seek greater transparency and equitable trust as embodied power in understanding self as 
part of others (Arja et al., 2013). Without trust, there is a low level of relationship and the 
company secretary role cannot have the independence to develop itself to the context or as 
part of a team. Particularly in a crisis or difficult situation, the board is tested and individuals 
under pressure may revert to their individual type/role rather than focusing on the board as 
an entity, which can impact on the effectiveness of the board. In consequence, it is more 
often that the least visible roles within the board become the most critical and their invis- 
ible leadership practices contribute more towards consensus in decision making. As such, the 
company secretary role is able to retain a broader board focus as part of making an individual 
contribution to the board. 
In this chapter, the company secretary has illustrated the link between role and leadership, 
but this also applies to the rest of the board, as a group of individuals working together. Each 
role engages with the other roles and the board collectively is effective where the output of 
the whole leadership team is greater than the output of the sum of the parts. It is this value 
added that the board should be pursuing as a potential rather than realised contribution and 
effective performance. 
In reality, the company secretary is more likely to be the ‘calm amongst the storm’, in offer- 
ing a board contribution that not only resolves conflict issues, but also solves problems of co- 
operation and co-ordination within the politically contested, powerful arena of board governance 
and leadership. Ultimately, the independent discretionary mindset of the company secretary as 
a leader is a necessity that contributes to other board members’ perceptions of value, adding to 
highly effective leadership teams. This is an internally powerful ‘invisible leadership’ role in the 
elite corporate board that deserves greater peer and external recognition. 
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Notes 
1 The term ‘company secretary’ in the UK and other Commonwealth countries is an equivalent to the US 
term ‘corporate secretary’ and to the term ‘board secretary’ in China. 
2 Institute of Chartered Secretaries (ICSA) https://www.icsa.org.uk/ 
3 Anglo-Saxon corporate governance. 
4 Corporate governance officer. 
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